Since 2021, China’s share of total EU exports has remained below the 10% threshold, marking the end of a brief five-year stretch (2017–2021) when it ranked as a primary trade partner. In 2025, the share is projected to fall below 2012 levels. In macro-level trade analysis, countries accounting for over 10% of exports are typically considered primary partners, those between 3% and 10% as secondary, and those below 3% as marginal or peripheral.
By that standard, China is no longer a primary partner for the EU—not even close. Imports and geopolitics may keep it in the spotlight, but export-wise, that status simply doesn’t hold.
We took a closer look at how EU imports of certain rare-earth metals in raw form have evolved. Frankly, there’s been little improvement, at least when it comes to imports of rare-earth metals, all of which still come from China.
US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick cited the cancellation of export controls on ethane shipments to China as an example of the meeting’s outcomes. We tend to see this as nothing more than a no-brainer.
Ethane is a key chemical feedstock for the plastics industry. China started importing ethane from the U.S. in 2019, during Trump’s first term. Although Trump threatened to curb ethane exports to China in his second term, this now appears to have been a political bluff since nearly half of U.S. ethane exports go to China. Restricting them would be counterproductive.
On the other hand, China lacks alternative suppliers, so this outcome seems like an obvious and inevitable decision requiring little negotiation by either side. In practice, China sources 100% of its ethane needs from the U.S.
The Ministry of Commerce has decided to extend its investigation into pork imports from the EU for six months, reinforcing the notion that this is a direct response to the EU’s tariffs. While the official statement cites the “complexity of the subject,” this phrase appears to signal that China is linking the probe to ongoing negotiations over electric vehicle tariffs.
China’s exports tied to overseas project execution have shown no structural growth over the last decade, but instead reflect cyclical volatility and geopolitical shocks. The return to $16 billion in 2025 is a recovery, not an expansion, suggesting China’s global contracting ambitions remain intact, but not significantly scaled up.
These exports are a good gauge of global project activity, but a poor indicator of momentum. The ceiling hasn’t moved.
The same gauge sheds light on the geographical distribution of China’s overseas projects.
If you search on Baidu for how to ensure payment when exporting to Russia, the top results are a list of financial service providers claiming they can help secure payments from Russian buyers.
The most prominent recommendation is Yishang, not a bank, but a cross-border trade service platform that facilitates compliant settlement between China and markets like Russia. Another “solution” is opening offshore accounts in Central Asian countries, then converting the funds into USD or RMB before remitting them back to China.
But the bottom line is: at some point, a Chinese bank has to be involved in any cross-border payment.
Rather than addressing whether some Chinese banks are helping Russia bypass EU trade restrictions, Beijing dismisses the sanctions as groundless under international law without mentioning the actual cause behind them: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Starting June 10, the EU imposes a 62.4% anti-dumping duty on hardwood plywood from China. The measure will apply provisionally for six months.
An EU industry group also alleges that Chinese plywood contains Russian wood, despite sanctions banning such imports
From January to May 2025, China expanded its trade surplus with the EU, ASEAN, Japan, Hong Kong, India, the UK, Canada, Latin America, RCEP member countries, Africa, and Belt & Road partners.
Its surplus with U.S dropped to $115 billion from $129 billion a year earlier. Its deficit increased with Taiwan and New Zealand while reducing the deficit with Russia, Australia, and South Korea.
China’s trade surplus in May 2025 rose 25% year-on-year. For the January–May period, the surplus is up 40% compared to the same period in 2024 — averaging more than $3 billion per day. Over the last twelve months the goods surplus was of $1.13 trillion.
Chinese citizens have a clear understanding of the economic situation. However, there’s little sign that strengthening the social safety net, a frequent recommendation for China’s economy, is actually underway.
Although Monaco is not an EU member, it is effectively part of France’s trade and customs regime and by extension, part of the EU trade space. Almost everything it might want to source from China is readily available next door in France, so there’s little need to deal with specific paperwork. There are a few exceptions, such as sourcing items like lightweight hats for large-scale events like the Formula 1 Grand Prix but beyond that, Monaco’s imports from China are minimal.
That’s why an unusually large shipment, worth nearly $100 million, inevitably draws attention. In March, a roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) vessel was shipped from China to Monaco. Its size suggests it’s intended for regional shipping routes.
Thanks for reading! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
We are committed to sharing with you the best trade analysis we have to offer.
If you would like to share something with us, feel free to comment in the section below or drop us a line at [email protected]