EU’s import growth is still the single best “gauge” of China’s overall export momentum.
Without the current growth in imports from the European Union, China might still be able to squeeze out another percentage point or two of export growth from the developing world but only for a year or two. Sustaining a double-digit surge of 12 to 14 percent from developing economies, however, would quickly run into several structural limits.
Lower-middle-income consumers simply cannot absorb the same basket of high-tech goods Europe buys without deeper price cuts.
As Chinese exports crowd out local industry, more emerging markets are turning to safeguards and local-content rules.
Shipping routes, port capacity, and dollar funding costs remain bottlenecks, especially in West Africa and parts of Latin America.
With Europe currently accounting for roughly 15 % of China’s exports and still growing, it is EU’s demand that makes the math work. If EU import growth slipped from today’s 6.4 % to 0 %, the rest of the world would have to pick up the slack. Holding everything else constant, developing-economy markets would need to expand their purchases from China by 12 % instead of today’s 11 %. A five-point contraction in the EU (–5 %) pushes that requirement to almost 14 %.
China can partially offset the loss by leaning harder on the Global South, but only within limits and at the cost of lower margins and more trade disputes
A 12 to 14 percent surge in imports from developing countries is simply not feasible. Chinese exports to advanced economies account for about 45% of its total exports. That means any significant slowdown in these markets can’t be offset by developing countries alone.
Global trade doesn’t get rattled just because something bad happens. It reacts to how governments respond, and even more so when governments are the source of the disruption.
Natural disasters, pandemics, wars, and even blocked canals may cause temporary disruptions, but they rarely lead to lasting uncertainty because global trade adapts.
What really moves markets and reshapes trade flows are policies: tariffs, sanctions, regulations, or political decisions that change the rules of the game.
Data covers only up to Q1 2025. Trump’s “Liberation Day” not included
Sometimes policy responses help reduce uncertainty. During COVID-19, for example, governments stepped in with stimulus, subsidies, and logistics support to keep goods moving. But policies can also be the very cause of uncertainty. Trade wars, sudden regulatory changes, or unpredictable political moves often inject more volatility into global trade than any external shock.
The data behind the Trade Uncertainty Index points to a clear conclusion:
It is policy, whether as a reaction or as a trigger, that sets the tone for uncertainty and determines how global trade adapts or falters.
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen floated initial ideas for transforming the global trade order, suggesting a potential replacement or at least a redesign of the non-functional World Trade Organization.
The bleakest view about the WTO is that it is steadily drifting into irrelevance. Its dispute settlement system has been paralyzed for years. Rendering rules are unenforceable. Negotiations are stalled, the rulebook outdated, and major economies increasingly act outside its framework. As global trade fragments into regional blocs and issue-specific coalitions, even its strongest backers now speak of redesign or outright replacement. In this view, the WTO is no longer the anchor of global trade, but a relic.
Over the past decade, Vietnam has become one of Asia’s most trade-integrated economies, positioned at the intersection of the CPTPP, RCEP, and bilateral FTAs with the EU, UK, Japan, and Korea.
This June, Vietnam launched its first Free Trade Zone in Danang (DFTZ), designed to integrate manufacturing, logistics, IT, digital services, and innovation under a single regime: tax incentives, customs prioritization, and global shipping capabilities.
The move signals Vietnam’s ambition to move up the value chain. It is a shift that feels familiar, and one cannot help but wonder how much of it is a calibrated imitation of its neighbor, China.
One month from now marks five years since the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement entered into force. While the deal has clearly boosted Vietnam’s exports to the EU, it has fallen short of expectations in the other direction, raising concerns that Vietnam is becoming a sort of second China. That may sound like an exaggeration, but it isn’t. Since the agreement took effect, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the EU has soared, now accounting for a striking 63 percent of total bilateral trade. Put differently, the EU imports nearly €5 from Vietnam for every €1 it exports.
Relative to their GDPs, the EU imports much more from Vietnam than from China
From January to April 2025, the EU’s trade deficit with China averaged nearly €1 billion per day (€0.97 billion, to be exact).
At the center of the investigation are several criminal networks, primarily run by Chinese nationals, that control the entire supply chain of goods imported from China into the EU. These networks manage everything from distribution across Member States to sales to final customers, while also laundering money and repatriating profits to China while evading customs duties and orchestrating large-scale VAT fraud.
Cognac exports to China fell 28% year-on-year by volume in the January–April period.
The increase in exports was contingent on the ASF disease, that’s all.
Our projection indicates EU meat exports to China will fall below 2016 levels in 2025
According to Reuters, China is “double counting” new car sales by pretending brand-new exports are used cars.
New cars are registered in China as if they were sold domestically, even when no customer has purchased them. These zero-mileage “used” cars are then shipped abroad. On paper, each vehicle is counted twice: once at registration and again at export, creating an inflated picture of economic activity.
If you browse through China’s Customs database, you won’t find a single drop of imported Iranian crude oil. And yet, in 2025, China is importing around 1.5 million barrels per day. Not a bad trick, huh?
Despite aggressive efforts to diversify, China’s pure electric car exports outside the EU plateaued at $9.5 billion in both Jan–May 2024 and Jan–May 2025. This flatline suggests that China has hit a ceiling in non-EU markets for pure electric cars. China, in fact, is switching to hybrid plug-in cars, something not foreseen not long time ago.
China’s planners often see the present as a frozen frame, stable and predictable, only to be surprised when it melts. A few years ago, EU punitive tariffs on Chinese EVs were likely seen as unthinkable.
China’s overall electric car exports fell by 10%.
China’s official GDP data drops July 16. Until then, here’s our forecast. It is early enough that you can blame us if we’re way off, or treat us to a coffee (or better yet, a gelato) if we get it right. It’s summer — anything goes!
When China reported its export data on June 23 it reflects goods shipped in May. These shipments typically take 60 to 90 days to reach Europe and clear EU customs. As a result, the EU will register these Chinese exports mostly in August. However, the EU’s import statistics for August are not released until mid-October. This means that a clear picture of China’s export performance to the EU in spring only becomes available by fall. In today’s unsettled global environment, such a six-month lag risks undermining timely responses and increases the chance of being caught off guard by developments that are already well underway.
The physical delay from shipping and customs is structural and can’t be avoided. But the information gap doesn’t have to be. There are several ways to close these blind spots. Otherwise, ignoring China’s export data is like trying to navigate with your eyes closed for three months.
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