Putin met with Xi in Beijing on February 4, 2022. During the meeting, they issued a joint statement declaring a ‘no-limits’ friendship. Three weeks later, Russia invaded Ukraine.
The ‘no-limits’ friendship has driven mutual trade over the three years since the invasion, surpassing the previous seven years. This highlights how China has thrown Russia a lifeline—one that comes with strings attached.
In the minds of Chinese planners in 2022, to comply with the ‘unlimited friendship’ with Russia, there was only one priority on their shopping list: energy.
Since the invasion, China’s energy imports from Russia have doubled, and energy, in the form of mineral fuels, now makes up three-quarters of its total imports from the country. To achieve this, downgrading Saudi Arabia to the second spot as China’s top crude supplier was not a concern. China’s expenditures on Russian energy during the course of the war have exceeded a quarter of a trillion dollars ($274 billion for the period 2022-2024). In three years of war, China’s imports of mineral fuels from Russia have surpassed the total imports from the previous nine years.
Exports to Russia jumped 71% to $116 billion, up from $68 billion in 2021. In just two years (2023-2024), China exported more to Russia than during the entire first five-year term of Xi Jinping.
Over the decade leading up to the invasion, China exported $22 billion worth of vehicles—both passenger and commercial—to Russia. In just the past three years, that figure has surged to $54 billion.
While China cites its role in the green transition as its main argument in its tariff dispute with the EU, it overlooks the fact that 99% of the cars exported to neighboring Russia are combustion-engine vehicles.
China exported more bulldozers to Russia during the invasion period than in the previous ten years.
China offset the drop in cereal imports from Ukraine by ramping up cereal imports from Russia fivefold
Wouldn’t be surprising if China claims it wants to help rebuild Ukraine—through the relentless and mandatory promotion of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative
The World Trade Organization was formally established on January 1, 1995. With the EU, China, and the U.S. making up a third of global trade, escalating tariffs and countermeasures are turning trade rules into a tangled spaghetti bowl. As disputes pile up, the WTO’s ability to mediate is looking more uncertain than ever, raising questions about its future relevance in global commerce
An unusual shift. China’s exports of processing units to Norway surpassed those to Germany.
The two state-owned companies are Dongfeng and Changan.
If a merger is indeed the outcome, it would simply follow China’s usual playbook. The country has a history of consolidating state-owned enterprises to create national champions.
China and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to extend their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation until 2026. However, mounting concerns over the sustainability of Kyrgyzstan’s debt to China are rising. The country currently owes around $1.7 billion to the Export-Import Bank of China, a significant burden stemming from loans used to finance large infrastructure projects under the BRI.
Kyrgyzstan’s top resource is gold. We wonder if it plays a role in servicing this debt.
In 2024, China’s imports from Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed from nearly nothing to $3 billion, with a staggering 94% of this import value attributed to gold.
In the auto sector, more than 6.8 million vehicles were traded in for new ones, driving sales by 920 billion yuan
In 2024, China imported 135 billion standalone chips and exported 83 billion. The exported chips (FOB) were priced at half the value of the imported chips (CIF) and were nearly 20% heavier.
Thirty-one out of the 41 mining sites with foreign stakes are owned by Chinese companies, including CATL.
Data 2024
Beauty/lipsticks (33%), Tobacco (12%), Jewellery (11%), Watches (8%), Handbags (7%), Perfume (4%), Spirits (4%), Clothing 2%