For China, the trade surplus is a goal, not a by-product. At the current pace, it’s on track to top $1.2 trillion in 2025, up nearly 30% year-to-date through August, an amount roughly equal to 1.4% of the rest of the world’s GDP, effectively siphoned off.
Beijing’s “deposit” tariffs hit EU pork. China imported about $2.8bn from the EU in 2024. But luxury** ladies’ handbags from France, Italy and Spain were bigger last year ($3.4bn) and look set to slip to about $2.8bn in 2025, roughly one-third below 2022.
There are no announced Chinese tariffs on EU luxury ladies’ handbags. The slump looks demand-driven, not policy-driven. The reason is wary households and a year of negative CPI.
Retaliation explains pork. The consumer explains the rest, and it bites harder.
** Luxury bag defined as CIF price/unit above $1000
Topping $100 billion and over 3% of Africa’s GDP, China’s trade surplus with Africa is set to rise 17 times in seven years, at odds with Beijing’s official narrative.
Beijing’s lines are familiar: we will increase imports from Africa (FOCAC 2018) and $300 billion of imports over three years (Dakar 2021). Those claims aren’t necessarily false. Imports did rise in level terms and, cumulatively, can be toted up to hit a round-number pledge.
But charts show what the rhetoric hides: the balance.
From 2018 to 2025, China’s imports from Africa inch from $99bn to $119bn (+20%), while exportsjump from $105bn to $223bn (+112%). The surplus doesn’t just widen.
It blows out from $6bn to $103bn (about 17 times)
While the messaging misleads without lying it spotlights gross imports, not the net balance, letting a genuine increase obscurea much faster export surge. The promised cumulative target ($300bn in three years) allows the propaganda to be true even as the surplus balloons each year.
China´s frequent emphasis on “non-resource” imports implies diversification and value-add for Africa, yet the flat import line suggests limited traction beyond commodities, so the terms-of-trade gap persists. Also, selective baselines (such as a strong month, or a three-year tally) mask the long trend that matters.
Some may claim that the bottom line is that China can truthfully claim it is importing “more” from Africa.
However, the fuller picture is that it’s exporting far more, far faster, so the real narrative is the widening surplus.
China announced graphite export controls on October 20, 2023 in a joint notice by the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs. Exports then fell in 2024. The early story—front-loading ahead of the December 1, 2023 start date doesn’t fit the data, since 2023 shipments were close to the five-year average. A better explanation is administrative timing: controls arrived before licensing procedures were fully in place, which slowed approvals.
Revisiting spherical graphite
This is the key battery-anode feedstock.
Volumes dipped in 2024, then rebound toward the pre-controls run rate in 2025 est.
In 2025, exports are tracking back toward pre-controls levels, while the average export price is about 10% lower than in 2024. Why the same volumes at lower prices? Isn’t it a paradox?
The policy goal is long-run dominance of the battery and EV supply chain, not quarterly margins. Licensing adds uncertainty and low prices render many non-Chinese projects uneconomic. Financing slows in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. At the same time, battery and anode makers receive a clear signal: for reliable, cost-effective feedstock, build capacity inChina. Exporters respond to permit incentives by pricing keenly to secure approvals, and align with national goals.
This is not a paradox
It is policy working as intended. Volumes normalize, prices stay low, overseas investment slows, and production gravitates toward China, while the state retains discretionary control levers it can pull as needed.
China’s inbound tourism receipts up 44%. Transport and Other Business Services account for more than half (56%) of China’s services exports. Intellectual Property exports down 28%.
Recovery reaches old highs; breaking above remains tough.
Outbound tourism — SAFE data through July 2025
Inbound tourism — SAFE data through July 2025
China’s intellectual-property trade gap widened. In Jan–Jul, IP imports rose about 5% while exports fell nearly 30%, pushing the import-to-export ratio to roughly 5:1 from 3:1 a year earlier.
In the SAFE data, exports rose 8.4% while imports fell 3.8%. China Customs shows a milder export rise (+6.1%) and a smaller import drop (–2.7%). That leaves the Customs-reported goods surplus $133 billion larger than SAFE’s for Jan–July, down from $188 billion a year earlier. Even so, the gap remains large: at this pace it implies an annual discrepancy of roughly $250 billion or about 1.4% of China’s GDP
EU export data for July will be released on September 15. In the meantime, Germany offers a useful gauge. German exports to China are down 15% so far in 2025 and 24% below their 2022 peak. The slump is driven mainly by falling auto sales, which hit Germany harder than other EU members. Still, the outlook for the EU as a whole is gloomy too.
For comparison, in August Germany sold 9% more to the UK than to China. That says it all.
According to the survey released on September 10 by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, the sentiment of the U.S companies established in China is the lowest since 2000. Only 41% of US businesses are optimistic about the five-year business outlook in China
“We have witnessed others using our trade dependence against us. We have to put an end to this.”
State of the Union address by President von der Leyen
Full text here.
The Energy Ministry of Germany, together with wind industry associations, has outlined a resilience plan for permanent magnets. That’s the good news: the risk is finally named. The hard part is execution.
With over 90% of permanent magnets made in China, dependency runs through the whole supply chain, not just wind, but EVs, mechanical engineering, and defense as well. Alternatives outside China are currently insufficient and more expensive, so reducing exposure will require years.
The report cites 2024 data. As for 2025, the situation is getting worse, see below.
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